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THE CULTURAL TRANSMISSION OF FAITH
Why innate intuitions are necessary, but insufficient, to
explain religious belief
Will M. Gervais*, Aiyana K. Willard, Ara Norenzayan and Joseph Henrich
University of British Columbia, Department of Psychology, Department of Economics, Canadian
Institute for Advanced Research
ABSTRACT The cognitive science of religion integrates insights from diverse
scientific disciplines to explain how people acquire, represent and transmit
religious concepts. This perspective has led to a fruitful research program on
the naturalistic origins of religion. However, it has thus far not directly addressed
a key component of religion: faith or committed belief. The present review
proposes a framework that integrates standard approaches from the cognitive
science of religion with established models of cultural evolution and cultural
learning. According to this synthetic approach, innate cognitive content biases
explain how people mentally represent gods, and cultural evolutionary models
explain why people come to believe and commit to the particular supernatural
beliefs that they do. This synthesis offers a more complete picture of the
origins and cultural persistence of religious belief.
KEY WORDS religion; cultural evolution; cognitive science of religion; atheism;
dual inheritance theory
The cultural transmission of faith
In recent years, researchers from a variety of disciplines have begun to make signifi-
cant progress in understanding the evolutionary and cognitive origins of religion.
One school of evolutionary thought sees religion as a naturally selected genetic
adaptation for cooperative group living (e.g., Sosis and Alcorta [2003]; Wade
[2009]; Wilson [2003]), while an alternative perspective argues that religion is a
natural by-product of normal, everyday psychological processes that evolved for
other purposes (e.g., Atran [2002]; Atran and Norenzayan [2004]; Barrett [2004];
Bloom [2007]; Boyer [2001]; Foster and Kokko [2009]; Guthrie [1993]; McCauley
[2000]; Pyysiäinen [2001]). In this ‘cognitive byproduct’ view, we do not have a
mind for religion; rather, religion has evolved culturally to fit the minds we have.
Despite the growing influence of the cognitive byproduct perspective, there is
considerable room for debate about the role of cultural processes in the evolution
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of religion (see, e.g., Barrett [in press]; Geertz and Markússon [2010]). In particular,
one common argument (e.g., Barrett [2004]; Pyysiäinen and Hauser [2010]) is that
religious beliefs arise naturally and effortlessly from the biases and tendencies of
the human mind, with minimal or no need for extensive cultural scaffolding.
This work has led to important insights into the cognitive tendencies and intuitions
that bias the human mind towards religiosity and constrain the range of possible
religious intuitions across cultures (e.g., Atran and Norenzayan [2004]; Barrett
[2000]; Henrich [2009]; Kirkpatrick [1999]; Pyysiäinen and Antonnen [2002]).
In the present paper, we also start from the central argument that religious rep-
resentations can best be explained as cognitive byproducts of ordinary human
thinking. We build on this insight and propose an updated theoretical model
that allows for a much greater role than previously assumed for cultural learning
processes in shaping and sustaining religious beliefs. We thus situate the cognitive
science of religion more firmly within existing frameworks of cultural evolution
which emphasize that human thinking and behavior are powerfully shaped both
by genetic and cultural inheritance (see e.g., Boyd and Richerson [1985]; Richerson
and Boyd [2005]; for related perspectives, see Bulbulia [2008]; Schaller et al. [2010];
Sperber [1996]; Norenzayan and Gervais [in press]). In doing so we invite debate
and further research on this relatively neglected topic in the evolutionary study
of religion.
The cornerstone of this updated model is twofold: (1) the cultural transmission of
concepts – including supernatural religious concepts – are dependent on the cogni-
tive biases that constrain and canalize their content; and (2) these concepts also
depend on cultural learning biases that push individuals to selectively attend to
and acquire both concepts and degrees of commitment or belief from those
around them. We propose that a combination of these two processes has led to
the proliferation of certain kinds of religious beliefs, rituals and devotions in the
world. We show how this perspective retains the basic insights and explanatory
power of the cognitive byproduct perspective, but in addition, address previously
unanswered questions about the key distinction between mentally representing
supernatural concepts as opposed to believing in them. Take, for example the
Mickey Mouse problem, which illustrates that many fictional characters like
Mickey Mouse have similar cognitive content as gods, yet are not believed to be
real nor committed to the way a god would be (Atran 2002; Atran and Norenzayan
2004). McCauley and Cohen (2010) recently approached this problem by arguing
that there is no natural partition between religious and other cultural represen-
tations and therefore it may not be clear on what grounds we differentiate them
scientifically. We couldn’t agree more. Religion is a family-resemblance category,
and therefore there is no natural partition between religious and other cultural rep-
resentations. However, we argue that a significant puzzle remains: scientists need
to explain the psychological difference between supernatural beliefs that are men-
tally represented but treated as fictional (fairies in folk tales, the gods of other reli-
gions), and those that are mentally represented and evoke deep worship and
commitment (the gods of one’s own group). We submit that theories of cultural
evolution can explain why some counterintuitive representations galvanize pro-
found commitment, while others are treated merely as entertaining curiosities,
despite their transmission advantage. The distinction between mental represen-
tation and belief-commitment is crucial to explain cultural differences in the
degree of religious commitment around the world, the existence of disbelief, and








































how certain gods, like Zeus – despite having similar cognitive content throughout
the ages – can move from a worshiped deity to the fictional character of myths and
stories. We thus explain why a supernatural agent with identical content and sup-
ported by exactly the same cognitive biases can in one place or time be an idol of
immense devotion, while in a different time or place can be merely myth or fanciful
tale: this is the so-called ‘Zeus Problem’ (Gervais and Henrich 2010).
The evolution of cultural learning
Imagine that tomorrow morning you wake in a strange and novel environment,
surrounded by strange people, flora and fauna. Your stomach rumbles hungrily,
and you decide to rustle up some breakfast. How would you decide what is safe
to eat? You may notice that a lot of people are gathering small brown nuts from
a local bush. That is a good sign: if lots of people are interested in these nuts,
there’s a good chance that they are good to eat. On the other hand, you notice
some people gathering mushrooms instead. However, many of the people gather-
ing nuts are obviously successful, while the mushroom gatherers look to be strug-
gling. The nut gatherers are healthy, strong and others look to them for guidance.
Finally, you notice that these fit individuals are actually eating the brown nuts. In
this rather speculative example, you (a naïve cultural learner) are faced with the
question of what to believe about a new environment. Should you believe that
nuts are delicious and nutritious, should you believe that mushrooms are prefer-
able, or should you instead set out on your own and begin trying various foods
for yourself?
This anecdote illustrates a fundamental point about howhumans come to commit
to certain beliefs. Although social learning can be found in many animal species
(e.g., Whiten [2005]), humans rely upon each other for adaptive information to an
unparalleled degree in the animal kingdom. Unlike other animals, humans – even
foragers – cannot survive without tapping the vast reserves of accumulated cultural
knowledge about finding food, making shelters, cooking and producing tools. As a
consequence, our species is addicted to culture, and the vast bulk of preferences,
motivations, attitudes and beliefs are – or can be – influenced by transmission
from other members of their social group (Henrich and McElreath 2003). We
argue that a scientific understanding of the origins of religious faith would be
incomplete without considering this critical dependence on others as sources of
information. Below we discuss cultural learning biases and empirical evidence for
them inmore detail.We then explain how these cultural learning biases shed impor-
tant light on the cultural spread and stability of religious beliefs and practices.
Because humans depend on others for information, they must be sensitive to the
quality of the information they acquire from different sources. Some cultural evol-
utionary theories (e.g., Henrich and McElreath [2003]; Richerson and Boyd [2005])
recognize two broad types of psychological mechanisms that aid in the processing
of such information, termed representational content biases and context biases (or
model-based learning biases), respectively. When using content biases, humans selec-
tively retain some information because of differences in the actual content of infor-
mation. Some types of information are easier to remember, more emotionally
evocative (fitness relevant), or allow more potent inferences to be made about
the surrounding world. Concepts supported by these content biases would hold









































focus of much of the previous work in the understanding of the cognitive origins of
religion, while context biases have received little attention (Henrich 2009). Though
there are several other relevant perspectives on the processes of cultural evolution
(see, e.g., Donald [2001]; Sperber [1996]; Tomasello [1999]), and important nuances
and distinctions, a complete overview and detailed comparisons is beyond the
scope of this paper. Instead we focus on these cultural learning biases within the
framework of cultural evolution to explain the transmission of religious belief.
The adaptive value of context learning biases is evident in the above food
example. One strategy is for cultural learners to weight how common various
beliefs appear to be in their immediate cultural context. If a naïve cultural learner
places weight on the prevalence of a certain belief (say, by noticing that most
people gather nuts rather than mushrooms), that learner is utilizing a conformist
learning bias (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998; Kendal, Giraldaeu
and Laland 2009). A second strategy is to preferentially imitate cultural models who
are older, skilled, prestigious and successful (e.g., Gil-White and Henrich [2001]),
often referred to as a prestige-based learning bias.
A third context bias springs from the need for cultural learners to avoid decep-
tion. An unscrupulous model might knowingly transmit false information to
others, perhaps to maintain a competitive advantage. In this case, it is important
for learners to ensure that their models actually hold the beliefs they espouse
before adopting the belief themselves. Actions speak louder than words: they are
great cues of another’s underlying beliefs. For example, if a model who praises
mushrooms actually eats the mushrooms, a learner can be more certain that the
model holds the belief ‘mushrooms are delicious and nutritious’ rather than the
belief ‘mushrooms are toxic.’ Alternatively, if a model praises mushrooms but
refuses to eat them, the learner would be wise to treat this claim as dubious. In
this example, eating the mushrooms constitutes a credibility-enhancing display
(CRED) of the model’s underlying beliefs regarding mushrooms (Henrich 2009).
If models engage in behaviors that would be costly if opposing beliefs were held
(that is, if they engage in credibility-enhancing displays of their beliefs) learners
can be more confident that the model actually holds the belief, and as a result
they would be more receptive to these beliefs (Henrich 2009). In all three strategies
(conformist, prestige-based and CREDs) people rely not only on the content of
information (in the above example, what a learner already knows about nuts or
mushrooms), but also on the context in which learning occurs, that is, various
factors relating to a potential cultural model or models that affect the transmittabil-
ity of a belief.
In this view, learners are expected to utilize a variety of cues to assess which
potential information sources are more reliable, and come to preferentially
believe information from these sources. The capacities for context-dependent learn-
ing emerge early in development. Three- and four-year-old children are more likely
to believe information that comes from sources who have proven to be reliable;
they prefer sources with a track record of accuracy (e.g., Koenig and Harris
[2005]; Koenig, Clément and Harris [2004]; Pasquini et al. [2007]). Children are
able to monitor and track the reliability of different sources, using this information
to preferentially learn from previously accurate sources of information (Birch,
Vauthier and Bloom 2008). Children as young as four preferentially believe infor-
mation from sources who claim certainty (Sabbagh and Baldwin 2001), or who
appear more confident in their information (Birch, Akmal and Frampton in








































press). Children also appear to value experienced sources. When choosing whether
to imitate a previously reliable adult source or a previously reliable child source,
kids follow the adult (Jaswal and Neely 2007). Recent work shows that young chil-
dren readily track the visual attention of others (a ‘prestige cue’) and selectively
learn from those who were previously preferentially attended to, even under
novel circumstances and in the absence of observers (Chudek et al. 2010).
We next argue that content and context biases interact to affect the spread of
certain kinds of religious beliefs. They influence the transmission of religion in
different, but complementary, ways. We expect, as has been argued before, that
content biases make some concepts inherently more interesting, memorable and
transmittable. However, people should also be endowed with capacities for filter-
ing concepts that have dubious credibility, and therefore context biases should be
instrumental in explaining patterns of belief in various concepts. More specifically,
we argue that content biases affect the potential of a concept to become memorable
and contagious, but people will only come to believe in those salient concepts that
are supported by appropriate context biases that allow people to selectively acquire
cultural information.
Content biases: counterintuition and the cognitive science of religion
Evolutionary approaches to cultural transmission provide a rich set of cognitively
informed hypotheses regarding how the content of representations influences their
transmission (Boyd and Richerson 1985: 5; Sperber 1996). Specifically, cultural lear-
ners should be more likely to pay attention to, store and transmit representations
when these are judged more: (1) potentially actionable; (2) fitness relevant and
thus emotionally evocative; and (3) plausible or compatible:
(1) ‘Potentially actionable’ means that the content of a representation leads to
inferences that can readily influence subsequent actions, including additional
inferences (Inferential Potential: Boyer 2001). Representations, for example,
in which the causes of unpleasant circumstances (e.g., storms or illnesses)
are random with respect to the actions of those afflicted do not lead to
useful or helpful inferences or actions, and thus are not easy to maintain.
Evolutionarily non-actionable representations need not be stored because
they cannot be of help even if one remembers them. Instead, representations
that involve believing that illnesses are caused by the jealously of others (e.g.,
the ‘evil eye’) can lead to inferences about who might be causing a particular
illness and how one can avoid such illnesses in the future.
(2) ‘Fitness relevant’: natural selection should favor more attention and recall for
representational content of greater relevance to fitness, at least in ancestral
environments. Often such content sparks more positive or negative emotion-
al responses, thus adaptively biasing memory storage and recall. People
should tend to devote more cognitive resources to stimuli that evoke affective
reactions such as disgust, fear, etc., potentially leading to biases in cultural
evolution (e.g., Boyer and Lienard [2006]).
(3) ‘Plausible or Compatible’ representations involve a variety of expectations that
a learner might have about how the world works and, consequently, what is
more and less likely to be true. Some expectations rely heavily on our reliably
developing intuitions, including core cognitive processes related to such
domains as mechanics and biology (Spelke and Kinzler 2007). For example,









































that exist only probabilistically at anypoint in space, radically violate our intui-
tive expectations from folk mechanics and thus do not readily transmit. Such
plausible or compatible content biases can also be culturally acquired, such
that the possession of one mental representation biases the acquisition of
others. That is, having acquired a particular idea via cultural transmission, a
learner may be more likely to acquire another idea, because the two ‘fit
together’ in some cognitive or psychological sense. For example, believing
that performing a certain ritual in the spring will increase the crop harvest in
the summer might favor the acquisition of a belief that a similar ritual will
increase awoman’s odds of conception, a healthy pregnancyand the successful
delivery of a robust infant.
Researchers working in the cognitive science of religion have largely focused on
these types of content biases to explain the cognitive structure and cultural spread
of religious beliefs. This view is already well elaborated and has led to fruitful the-
orizing and empirical research (e.g., Barrett [2004]; Boyer [2003]; Pyysiäinen and
Antonnen [2002]). Here we discuss one influential hypothesis: that the presence
of mildly counter-intuitive content in concepts or narratives can bias memory in
a manner that would favor such concepts or narratives in cultural evolution (e.g.,
Barrett and Nyhof [2001]). Counter-intuitive concepts violate our core assumption
about the nature of things in the world; usually these assumptions focus on inten-
tional beings, animals, inanimate objects or events (expectations often associated
with the cognition domains of folkphysics, folkpsychology and folkbiology). By
departing systematically, but mildly, from established cognitive rules we use to
understand and organize information in our environment, they achieve greater
memorability. Examples of counter-intuitive concepts from this literature are ‘a
person who can be in two places at once’ (Boyer and Ramble 2001) and a ‘thirsty
door’ (Norenzayan et al. 2006). Furthermore, the presence of a few counter-
intuitive concepts in a narrative, even within a list of otherwise ordinary concepts,
improves memory for the entire narrative or list, increasing the transmission
advantage of the entire narrative (Norenzayan et al. 2006).
From the perspective just presented, many counter-intuitive concepts probably
create complex mixtures of plausibility, applicability and emotional evocativeness.
Many religious beliefs, for example, would appear to be more applicable, more
emotionally evocative, but less plausible than alternative non-religious concepts
or explanations. If counter-intuitive concepts, by their very nature, make stories
or beings seem less plausible (less believable), the optimal number of such violations
should be small. In an analysis comparing a sampling of successful andunsuccessful
Grimm’s fairy tales, successful (widely known) fairly tales had only two or three
counter-intuitive violations (Norenzayan et al. 2006). Successful counter-intuitive
representations are also likely to generate emotional responses, like fear or interest,
as well as actionable options and additional inferences.
Researchers have long recognized that representational content biases may play
an important role in religious belief. The supernatural agents endemic to religions
appear to possess a particularly evocative set of abilities (flight, omniscience or
transubstantiation) and characteristics (being invisible or wholly incorporeal) not
shared by more mundane agents. People find this minimal counterintuitiveness
memorable, giving these concepts a strategic advantage in cultural transmission:
they should be more likely to spread and persist. To be culturally successful,








































these deviations must be systematic but not radical departures from common sense
as to rupture meaning completely. As Sperber (1996: 73) has put it, these minimal
counterintuitions are ‘relevant mysteries,’ in the sense that they are closely con-
nected to background knowledge, but do not admit to a final interpretation. As
a result they are attention arresting and inferentially rich, and therefore encourage
further cognitive processing and multiple interpretations over time that facilitate
transmission.
The picture we have painted so far explains why religious concepts the world
over tend to have the peculiar cognitive structure that they do (e.g., containing a
few minimally counterintuitive elements), and why such structure is memorable
and contagious. However, it is a far step from memorability and mental represen-
tation to sincere belief in and passionate commitment to religious concepts. People
believe in only a small subset of the minimally counterintuitive agents that are
worshipped around the world, which are themselves but a small subset of all
minimally counterintuitive concepts. Furthermore, if these cognitive biases operat-
ing on representational content are sufficient to explain the persistence of religious
beliefs, why do people come to believe in only a small subset of supernatural agent
concepts, when so many concepts share the same or similar content conducive to
cultural success?
Can content biases alone explain faith?
While content biases appear to influence the mental representation, memorability
and social contagion of supernatural concepts, they may have difficulty explaining
why people come to devoutly commit to the particular supernatural concepts that
are prevalent in their own culture. Why do Christians passionately believe in Jesus
but not in Shiva (or vice versa for Hindus)? And why is it that Zeus, who has all the
cognitive elements necessary to be a successful god, has lost his spell and is no
longer a worshipped deity? In other words, can content biases (including the mne-
monic advantage of counterintuitive concepts) alone explain patterns of belief and
disbelief in supernatural agents?
In a humorous piece titled ‘Why Santa Claus Is Not a God,’ Barrett (2008)
recently attempted a solution to this puzzle of belief, relying on further refinements
of content biases. However, we are skeptical that content biases alone can solve the
aforementioned puzzles. (For a detailed critique, see Gervais and Henrich [2010]).
Cultural learners are not mere passive receptacles who believe in and commit to
any concept that is memorable and widespread. (See Bergstrom, Mehlmann and
Boyer [2006] for a similar point). Indeed, there are good reasons to suspect skepti-
cism or epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al. 2010) on behalf of cultural learners, even
in children. Given both the imperfection of cultural transmission and the threat of
manipulation from unscrupulous sources (Henrich 2009), a degree of incredulity is
warranted when evaluating new sources and types of cultural information.
Consistent with this, children show a sophisticated understanding of the difference
between reality and fictional concepts, and perhaps even some inherent resistance
to belief in counterintuitive concepts (see, e.g., Bergstrom et al. [2006]; Harris and
Koenig [2006]).
Decades of developmental research in psychology support the notion that chil-
dren appreciate the difference between real entities and fictional entities (e.g.,









































exist from those that only exist in pretense (e.g., DiLalla and Watson [1988];
Golomb and Galasso [1995]; Harris et al. [1991]; Morison and Gardner [1978];
Samuels and Taylor [1994]). They can even reason about how fictional agents in
one fantasy context might view fictional agents in another fantasy context; they
report, for example, that Batman would think that Spongebob is fictional, even
though both are fictional characters (Skolnick and Bloom [2006]). Children
readily engage in pretend play, without confusing pretense and reality (e.g.,
Golumb and Kuersten [1996]; Woolley and Wellman [1990]). Many children even
entertain imaginary friends, but they still appreciate that these companions are
not, in fact, real (Taylor [1999]).
Children are also sensitive to the different types of information they could
acquire, even from a reliable source. Older children (eight to nine years old) dis-
tinguish between facts and opinions, showing a greater degree of conformity to
others’ views of factual matters than to others’ opinions (Banerjee et al. 2007). As
children age, they become increasingly aware that others may systematically
distort information. Ten- and 11- year olds are skeptical of self-reports as accurate
information about valued personality characteristics such as intelligence (Heyman
and Legare 2005). Children recognize that others might misrepresent the world.
The development of children’s abilities to think critically about sources of infor-
mation and the types of information for which they might be reliable demonstrates
that cultural learners might rely more or less heavily on different context biases for
different types of information. (See Heyman [2008].)
Children are able to both easily reason about the difference between reality and
fiction and also to mentally represent fictional counterintuitive agents. To compli-
cate matters even further, there is some evidence that children are actually quite
skeptical of concepts that violate their intuitive expectations about the world.
Mead’s (1932) classic study of animism on the island of Manus in New Guinea
revealed that children do not readily commit to and believe in the counterintuitive
concepts they hear expressed by adults. Rather, the children were somewhat resist-
ant to adopting such concepts. Although controversy surrounds Mead’s work,
similar patterns emerge from laboratory experiments that generally show that chil-
dren are more inclined to believe in intuitive concepts over counterintuitive concepts
(Harris and Koenig 2006; Harris et al. 2006). In one study, Harris and colleagues
(2006) asked children whether they thought a variety of different entities exist.
The children reported that a variety of empirically non-verifiable scientific entities
such as germs exist, and asserted the existence of endorsed beings like Santa Claus.
Although this appears to indicate that the children came to believe in counterintui-
tive agents like Santa Claus, children were more confident that scientific entities
exist than that endorsed beings exist. These authors argue that children might in
part be more skeptical of the endorsed beings simply because these beings
violate intuitive expectations, leading the children to ‘conclude that the existence
of special beings such as God or Santa Claus is more dubious than that of scientific
entities’ (Harris et al. 2006: 92).
This resistance to belief in counterintuitive concepts persists into adulthood.
Although university students rate minimally counterintuitive concepts as more
supernatural (Atran and Norenzayan 2004), they also rate them to be less believable
than intuitive concepts (Willard et al. 2010). Furthermore, Bloom and Weisberg
(2007) argue that adult scientific illiteracy stems in part from a resistance to believing
things that contradict domain-specific intuitions. For example, in one experiment








































(McKloskey, Caramazza andGreen 1980) Johns Hopkins undergraduates –many of
whom had taken college physics – were asked to predict the trajectories of objects
leaving curved tubes. Consistent with folk physics, and inconsistent with actual
physics, most participants guessed that the balls would have curved trajectories.
In a variety of domains, children and adults alike have a hard time believing in
concepts that violate intuitive expectations about the world.
In sum, content biases make some counterintuitive concepts memorable and,
therefore, widespread. However, cultural learners are easily able to remember,
represent and reason about concepts without necessarily believing in them. Fur-
thermore, some evidence suggests that people actually resist belief in concepts
that routinely violate intuitive expectations. This skepticism of counterintuitive
concepts poses a serious challenge for any model of religion that relies exclusively
upon representational content biases, as the very same feature (minimal counterin-
tuitiveness) that has been argued to cause religious concepts to spread and persist
in cultures may also make the concepts less believable. Content biases therefore
appear better able to explain why folktales and myths – that is, stories containing
some counterintuitive elements that people do not actually believe to be true – are
widespread and memorable than they are able to explain the fact that around the
world most people who have ever lived sincerely believe in and commit to only
the small subset of counterintuitive supernatural agents popularly endorsed
within their own cultural context.
Religious faith in cultural context
If content biases are insufficient to explain which sorts of religious beliefs people
commit to, how might context biases shed further light on religious beliefs?
Content biasesmake supernatural concepts interesting, memorable and contagious,
but context biases explain why people come to believe in a particular subset of the
supernatural concepts to which people are exposed (Atran and Henrich 2010;
Gervais and Henrich 2010). Most people adopt the religious beliefs of their
parents and surrounding communities, rather than coming to believe in everymem-
orable or attention-grabbing supernatural agent to which they are exposed. If most
of the people in a learner’s environment – and especially if the most successful
people in the area – say that Zeus throws lightning bolts, or that Yahweh will
judge people for their sins, it is likely that the learnerwill come to believe these prop-
ositions, just as the learner will come to adopt the styles of dress or cuisine also
demonstrated by the rest of the community. Furthermore, most religions give
believers ample opportunity to exhibit credibility-enhancing displays of their
fealty to a given god – public prayer, painful rites of passage, martyrdom – that
will further ratchet up belief in cultural learners. (See Henrich [2009] for a compre-
hensive treatment). Although the content of many supernatural agent concepts
make them likely god candidates, people tend to actually believe in only the super-
natural concepts supported by context biases.
Context biases make obvious many features of religion that are unexplainable by
content biases alone. Context biases can help explain patterns in people’s beliefs
about the origins of species, beliefs about death and patterns of belief and disbelief
in various supernatural agents (across societies and within individual lifespans).
Importantly, some noted researchers (e.g., Barrett [in press]) have made strong









































little or no cultural scaffolding. However, upon close examination, the limited
available evidence regarding these claims is fragmentary and often inconsistent.
In the three next sub-sections, we treat each of these domains as a case study in
which to explore the main prediction made by a cognitive byproduct perspective
that is informed by context biases: that supernatural concepts have predictable cog-
nitive structure that make them memorable and contagious, but people come to
believe only in the narrow subset of those supernatural concepts supported by
context biases and credibility enhancing displays within their immediate social
context.
Children’s reasoning about animal origins
If some elements of religion emerge naturally and require little or no cultural scaf-
folding, some form of theistic belief should be clearly present in young children
who have not yet been exposed to the cultural ideas that could modify these
core religious tendencies. Children’s beliefs about the origins of species are often
cited as evidence that some forms of supernatural beliefs are cognitive defaults
that are merely filled in by – rather than substantially influenced by – cultural con-
texts. Children might be intuitive creationists, predisposed to believe that animals
were created by some supernatural agent. They could fill in this blank with
whatever supernatural agent they find particularly memorable and interesting.
Children’s intuitions about the origins of species, then, may be crucial to an under-
standing of how supernatural beliefs are acquired.
Are children intuitive creationists, invoking the existence of supernatural agents
to explain the origins of species? Children in general tend to prefer teleological
explanations for things, liberally inferring function and purpose (Kelemen 2004).
Thus clouds do not just rain, they are for raining. This ‘promiscuous teleology’
has been argued to indicate that viewing nature as inherently intentional is a
default cognitive position. We find this hypothesis plausible, although we note
that there is as yet no direct experimental evidence that teleological thinking
causes inferences of a supernatural agent behind the purpose in nature – a possi-
bility that merits direct research.
In an empirical test of children’s beliefs about animal origins, Evans (2000) asked
children about where new types of animals come from in order to assess the degree
to which they use evolutionary and creationist concepts in their biological reason-
ing. The youngest children (roughly age seven) in this experiment were unsyste-
matic in their responses, claiming that new species spontaneously appear, evolve
or are products of intelligent creation with fairly equal regularity. Children of inter-
mediate age (around nine years of age) preferred creationist arguments to evol-
utionary arguments. Among the oldest children (around age 12), opinions were
fairly evenly split between evolutionist and creationist accounts.
While it is interesting that there was a temporary spike in creationist thinking
among nine-year-olds, it is difficult to see how these data strongly support the
notion that children, by default, believe in supernatural origins for species.
Indeed, the simplest interpretation of the data on the seven-year-olds is that
young children have no intuitions regarding where animals come from (this
stands in contrast to a wealth of developmental psychological evidence that even
infants have a variety of strong intuitions regarding core cognitive domains, as
recently reviewed by Spelke and Kinzler [2007]). At the same time, these data do








































not unequivocally support our prediction that children come to adopt beliefs sup-
ported by context biases. This may be because each potential answer (creationism,
evolution, spontaneous generation) entails a combination of intuitive and counter-
intuitive concepts. Furthermore, all children in this study shared a single cultural
context. This point is particularly salient because even four-year-olds are highly
cultural beings. Given that the seven-year-old children in this study were already
highly enculturated – most likely having already learned the native language
and food preferences of their surrounding culture, for example – and were from
the US Midwest, a strongly religious region, they may already have received
some explicit religious instruction, yet did not systematically endorse creationism.
A stronger test of our predictions would require an examination of animal-origin
beliefs among children from different cultural contexts with different prevailing
beliefs.
Another study (Evans 2001) ostensibly provides this test, exploring origin
beliefs in children from the Midwest who attended either fundamentalist or non-
fundamentalist schools. This study replicated the finding that nine-year-old
children have a temporary spike in creationist thinking (frommore-or-less random-
ness), leading some to interpret this as evidence for the emergence of religious
beliefs in children, independent of cultural context. However, a close look at the
methodology and data tell a much more complicated story. It is worth noting
that all children in this study were recruited in the same geographical region. In
fact, all were from among one of the most strongly religious parts of the United
States (the Midwest). Even among the ‘non-fundamentalist’ group, a full 24
percent of families attended a fundamentalist church. In sum, the children in the
different groups did not necessarily come from contexts that differed radically in
underlying religious beliefs – a strong test would have to compare, say, a group
of atheist Scandinavian children and a group of fundamentalist evangelical chil-
dren in Alabama. Nonetheless, by age 11, children largely mirrored the beliefs of
their parents. This population-difference is noteworthy, as it is suggestive of a
strong role for cultural learning in the emergence of creationist beliefs. This is
particularly striking because, as already mentioned, nearly a quarter of the ‘non-
fundamentalist’ children in fact attended fundamentalist churches. Among
children in a strongly religious region who attended neither fundamentalist
schools nor fundamentalist churches, most children nonetheless came to believe
in evolution by the time they left the fifth grade.1 Although it is possible that the
children overcame an innate creationism by effortful indoctrination at school,
this account makes the dubious assumption that Midwestern elementary school
curricula emphasize and teach evolution to the degree required to overturn a
strong default creationist belief. In contrast, recent evidence reveals that, even at
the high-school level, most American biology teachers do not adequately teach
evolution, and a sizeable minority openly espouse creationism (Berkman and
Plutzer 2011).
These results indicate an interesting dynamic in which children’s beliefs are sub-
stantially shaped by their surrounding cultural milieu (Bering, Blasi and Bjorklund
1Barrett (2010: 171) cited this very study as demonstrating that ‘young children with parents and schools
that affirm evolutionary accounts … still find creationist accounts more attractive.’ Other examples of









































2005 report a similar pattern). Both findings are consistent with the prediction
that – although young children may (or may not) intuitively favor creationist
explanations – children’s beliefs about the origin of species are substantially influ-
enced by context biases in cultural transmission. Indeed, even spending a short
amount of time in a well-designed museum exhibit can lead children to understand
evolutionary processes (Evans 2011). In other words, it is possible that people find
teleological thinking intuitive and evolutionary thinking comparatively counterin-
tuitive, but it is far from conclusive, given current evidence, that this inevitably (or
even strongly probabilistically) pushes people towards creationism. If nothing else,
some studies typically cited as supporting such a view do not, as a whole, typify
strong tests of the hypothesis that creationist beliefs emerge without cultural scaf-
folding. Instead, there appears to be a lot of room for context biases in cultural
learning to shape people’s beliefs about the origins of species, and adults’ predomi-
nant creationist beliefs (in many parts of the world) may have as much to do with
what they are explicitly or implicitly taught in a religious context – and what they
are not taught well in an academic context – as with what they find intuitively
compelling. We hope that future research will probe deeper into these important
questions.
Children’s reasoning about death
Afterlife beliefs have been discussed as another line of evidence suggesting that
religious intuitions arise innately without much aid from cultural learning.
Around the world, people tend to believe in some form of an afterlife in which
people retain their psychological properties after the physical body is dead
(Bering 2006). This, then, entails belief in agents with psychological properties,
but lacking physical bodies. That is, belief in the afterlife may be a minimally coun-
terintuitive belief that people adopt automatically, without needing context biases
to override the unbelievability of this counterintuitive claim. Bering and Bjorklund
(2004) investigated children’s intuitions about death and the afterlife in a simple
series of experiments. They introduced children to a puppet mouse and a puppet
crocodile. They emphasized that neither the mouse nor the crocodile were real,
but instructed the children to pretend that they were real. In a short play, the cro-
codile ate the mouse, and the children were told that the mouse ‘is not alive
anymore.’ The experimenters then asked the children a series of questions about
the mouse. Some of these questions focused on biological characteristics of the
mouse, such as ‘Will he ever need to go to the bathroom?’ Others focused on
psychological traits, such as ‘Does he know that he is not alive?’ Children reliably
reported that normal biological functions ceased after death, but psychological
traits persisted. This trend was particularly pronounced among younger children,
leading the authors to conclude that children innately believe in an afterlife. This
developmental timeline is crucial to the argument. The finding that younger chil-
dren were more likely to endorse a psychological afterlife than were older children
may be taken to indicate that this is an intuitive default cognitive position that is
only overridden with time.
Bering (2006) further elaborated this argument, proposing that afterlife beliefs
are a naturally selected evolutionary adaptation. In this view, beliefs in an afterlife
are the cognitive default; they are present in early childhood. These beliefs are only
overridden in later childhood, if at all. Although this account is consistent with








































children’s reasoning about the deadmouse, the role of religious enculturation in the
formation of afterlife beliefs remains an open question, as several other lines of evi-
dence, taken together, suggest that the matter is far from settled.
Bering’s findings contrast starkly with those of Harris and Giminez (2005), who
were similarly interested in children’s intuitions about death. They described the
death of a grandparent, rather than an explicitly fictional mouse, to Catholic chil-
dren using either religious or secular cues. Unlike Bering and Bjorklund (2004),
these authors found that older, rather than younger, children were more likely to
endorse a psychological afterlife. This was especially likely when the death was
framed in religious terms, implying that children readily (and perhaps initially)
adopt a strictly biological conception of death, but that they can successfully
recount a religious conception of death, replete with psychological immortality,
only after some religious teaching and when the problem is framed in religious
terms. In this example, the age difference would indicate that religious encultura-
tion leads to an increase, not a decrease, in afterlife beliefs. In other words, afterlife
beliefs may not be the default, but rather a separate narrative style about death that
is elaborated through explicit religious teaching.
Astuti and Harris (2008) further probed people’s intuitions regarding death. They
again asked a series of questions after describing a death in either religious or
secular contexts. They compared both adults and children in a village in Madagas-
car. In this area, both children and adults are regularly exposed to both animal and
human deaths. This is a particularly useful test because it is examining beliefs about
actual, concrete death, rather than the death of an admittedly fictional mouse
puppet (keep in mind the ease with which children can reason about fictional
agents without necessarily thinking that they are answering questions about real
entities). Adults and older children reliably stated that both physical and mental
processes ceased at death, unless asked in a religious context. In a detailed
follow-up with only children, the youngest participants (under five years old)
did not demonstrate reliable patterns in their conception of death. Older children
typically stated that both mental and physical processes ended at death. Taken
together, these results pose a serious challenge to the claim that afterlife beliefs rep-
resent a default position. On the contrary, they suggest that afterlife beliefs are the
reliable products of religious instruction. Children appear able to outline both a
biological and a religious conception of death. Both are honed and shaped by the
children’s surrounding culture over time. One possibility is that afterlife beliefs
are only a ‘soft’ cognitive default that is easily overcome by cultural learning. Alter-
natively, and consistent with the latter two sets of studies (Astuti and Harris 2008;
Harris and Giminez 2005), afterlife beliefs may be the end result of cultural trans-
mission shaped by context biases, and not a cognitive default at all. Either way, the
present evidence is consistent with the view that context biases play an important
role in the formation of these beliefs.
Atheism2: the cultural transmission of (dis)belief
Recently this journal published an interesting exchange regarding, among other
things, a debate about the implications of atheism for the ‘naturalness of religion’









































hypothesis (Barrett in press; Bering in press; Geertz and Markússon 2010). Accord-
ing to this hypothesis, some religious concepts emerge naturally, though probabil-
istically, during development. For example, Boyer (2008: 1039) argues that ‘some
form of religious thinking seems to be the path of least resistance for our cognitive
systems. By contrast, disbelief is generally the result of deliberate, effortful work
against our natural cognitive dispositions – hardly the easiest ideology to propa-
gate.’ Similarly, Barrett (2004: 108) claims that ‘being an atheist is not easy … As
odd as it sounds, it isn’t natural to reject all supernatural agents.’ Bloom (2007:
148) contrasts the claims of self-described atheists with the view that ‘people every-
where naturally have some tacit supernatural beliefs; these arise in children regard-
less of the culture.’ Thus, the naturalness of religion makes atheism appear, in a
sense, ‘unnatural.’ This perspective raises three distinct, but interrelated, possibili-
ties. First, it predicts that atheism should be unusual, only occurring in rare and
improbable situations worldwide. Second, it predicts that atheism is only ‘skin
deep,’ and that avowed atheists might retain some implicit theism (e.g., Bering
[in press]; see also Slingerland [2008]). Third, even if atheism exists at the implicit
level, it might only arise when people reflectively override theistic intuitions
(Barrett 2004). We evaluate each of these possibilities below and contrast these
strong predictions made by the ‘naturalness of religion’ hypothesis with a theoreti-
cal perspective that incorporates context-biased cultural learning. In this view,
atheism can be placed within the ‘naturalness of religion’ hypothesis as long as
the broader cultural context is also taken into account. (See, e.g., Geertz and
Markússon [2010] for a similar argument). At this stage, empirical data on the
psychology of atheism is scant, so this critical examination is necessarily limited.
However, many claims for the etiology of atheism remain untested, and are
currently open (and fascinating) empirical questions.
First, is atheism a rare aberration? A substantial and growing proportion of
North Americans claim to have no religion (Kosmin and Keysar 2001; Statistics
Canada 2003). Around the globe, there is a trend towards secularization likely
driven by economic and existential security, although, because of low birthrates
of secularized societies, levels of religiosity remain stable in the world overall
(Norris and Inglehart 2004). Although measuring the prevalence of atheism in
the world is no easy task, in one estimate, more than half of a billion people
claim to not believe in God or gods, making nonbelievers the fourth largest ‘religious’
group in the world today (Zuckerman 2007). Thus a substantial number of people
claim to be atheists, even though atheists are among the least trusted groups of
people in the world (e.g., Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann [2006]; Gervais [in
press]; Gervais, Shariff and Norenzayan [2010]; Jacoby [2004]).
Second, might all of these people openly espouse atheism while implicitly har-
boring theistic belief? This possibility is not, in principle, implausible given that
experimental psychologists often find divergence between explicit and implicit
measures of attitudes (e.g., Nosek [2007]). Furthermore, people often have little
or no introspective access into their own mental states that operate outside of con-
scious awareness, and thus may not be able to accurately report their implicit
beliefs in surveys (e.g., Nisbett and Wilson [1977]). Although there is a surprising
dearth of research directly examining the beliefs or intuitions of atheists, it is poss-
ible to approach the subject indirectly, by examining whether even avowed atheists
react similarly to believers when given subtle, implicit experimental religious
prods. In one experiment, Dijksterhuis et al. (2008) examined peoples’ feelings of








































authorship for events in a computer task. In this task, participants had to identify
words as either real or nonsense. When participants responded, the word disap-
peared. They were told, however, that they were competing against the computer
and that sometimes the computer would make the word disappear on its own.
When participants were subliminally flashed personal pronouns (‘I’, ‘me’) during
the task, they felt more personally responsible for the disappearing words than
when subliminally flashed the word ‘computer.’ This indicates that the
subliminally flashed word (a ‘prime,’ in the parlance of experimental psychology)
influenced the degree to which participants assigned credit for an action to either
themselves or an external agent.
Now to the key experiment. In a follow-up, participants felt less responsible for
making the words disappear when primed with ‘God’during the task. Importantly,
this effect was entirely driven by religious believers. Nonbelievers were unaffected
by even subliminal God primes, suggesting that atheists are indeed atheists, even
on an implicit level. This result is similar to one other priming study in which
implicit God primes increased generosity among believers but had no effect on
nonbelievers (Shariff and Norenzayan 2007: Study 2); similarly, across four
studies, God primes increased perceived social surveillance among believers, but
did not reliably affect nonbelievers (Gervais and Norenzayan in press). To the
extent that atheists are uninfluenced by implicit religious primes, we can conclude
that cultural learning of religion, which is absent among at least some atheists who
were never exposed to religion, plays a role in religious beliefs. However, several
other religious-priming studies have found similar responsiveness by believers
and nonbelievers (e.g., Pichon, Boccato and Saroglou [2007]; Randolph-Seng and
Nielsen [2007]; Shariff and Norenzayan [2007]: Study 1). Thus, the available litera-
ture is inconclusive regarding when, and why, explicitly nonreligious individuals
might be influenced by unconscious reminders of religion, and a number of
potential explanations (including, but not limited to, the putative existence of
implicit theism) for these inconsistencies are available (see Norenzayan, Shariff
and Gervais [2010] for a more detailed discussion). Further progress on this ques-
tion requires, for example, that researchers compare atheists who grew up in
largely religious contexts and subsequently abandoned faith (atheist converts) to
atheists who grew up in nonreligious contexts (lifetime atheists) in order to
conclusively determine the relative contribution of cultural learning to religious
disbelief. Therefore, the claim that atheism in general is only skin deep is an intri-
guing hypothesis that currently remains largely untested and poorly investigated.
This fascinating and open area deserves more direct research in the future.
Finally, is atheism more cognitively effortful than belief? If religion arises natu-
rally, then atheists might be able to sustain their disbelief only through the contin-
ual exertion of cognitive effort, in the same way that physicists can study subatomic
particles through the continual exertion of cognitive effort to override natural, yet
faulty, intuitions about the world. This claim has not to date been rigorously tested,
but available circumstantial evidence indicates that atheism might not be effortful
among individuals who were never exposed to context-based cues that one should
adopt religious belief. Zuckerman (2008) investigated the role of religion in
Denmark and Sweden, two of the most atheistic countries in the world. Zuckerman
was impressed, above all, by the banality of Scandinavian disbelief. These people
were not atheists because of Herculean efforts to control their latent belief.









































in which few people displayed religious CREDs. At the same time, some of our
own experimental research indicates that analytic reasoning reduces religious
belief (Gervais and Norenzayan 2010). Although this finding may also be taken
to support the notion that atheism requires cognitive effort, the chain of logic for
this latter assertion is unclear. Just because effortful analytic reasoning reduces reli-
gious belief, it does not follow that all religious disbelievers must use cognitive
effort to maintain their atheism (although some might).3 This is because there
likely are multiple psychological paths to atheism, including both cognitively
effortful religious deconversion and simply growing in the absence of context-
based cues supporting supernatural-agent beliefs. Nonetheless, much more
research is needed to determine the role of cognitive effort in atheism.
According to the view that religious beliefs are exclusively produced by intuitions
and content biases, atheism is unnatural and improbable. On the other hand, a view
that incorporates context biases predicts that both religious beliefs and atheism are
‘natural,’ in the sense that they are products of different cultural contexts. (For a
complementary perspective, see Geertz and Markússon [2010]). If a learner grows
up around religious models, he is likely to become religious. If, on the other
hand, a learner who grows up around people who do not hold religious beliefs– or
people who do not exhibit credibility-enhancing displays of their underlying
religious beliefs –will come to not hold religious beliefs, even if some natural intui-
tions, however weakly or strongly, might enable people to easily mentally represent
supernatural agents.
Lanman (2009; submitted) studied the role of credibility-enhancing displays of
religious conviction in the decline of religiosity in Scandinavia. The results were
consistent with the framework proposed in the present paper. Even among children
raised by parents who themselves believed in God, kids who did not see credibility-
enhancing displays of their parents’ faith (by, for example, observing them engage
in religious rituals), grew up to be nonbelievers. Consistent with this account,
analysis of raw World Values Survey data (downloaded 5 February 2011, from
www.worldvalues.org) from 86 209 individuals worldwide, reveals that of
people who report that they had an explicitly religious upbringing, 84 percent
become explicitly religious; in contrast, of people raised without religion, fewer
than half become explicitly religious. In other words, while some forms of disbelief
may involve effortful overriding of intuitive theistic beliefs, as has been argued
before (e.g., Barrett [2004]; Bloom [2007]; Gervais and Norenzayan [2010]), other
forms of atheism may arise because people simply did not have cultural support
for theistic belief, and subsequently never developed belief in the first place.
Religious belief is the natural product of cultural contexts in which learners
receive clear cues that their models hold religious belief; atheism naturally
results from contexts in which these cues are absent.
Context biases can also explain another puzzling aspect of religion: most people
are atheists when it comes to most of the supernatural agents about which they
have ever heard (Dawkins 2006). If content biases are sufficient to explain belief,
then how do people only come to believe in the ‘right’ gods (as usually judged
3In this regard, atheism (and, perhaps, faith) might be like golf. If you start playing when you are five,
you develop a natural swing and don’t have to think about it. If you start playing when you are 25, a
proper swing remains cognitively effortful!








































by their surrounding culture)? Why do Christians not believe in Zeus or Shiva?
Although this selective belief is unexplainable by content biases alone, it is easily
explainable if context biases determine the gods in which people come to believe
or disbelieve. Finally, context biases may also explain patterns in belief in some
supernatural agents across the lifespan. For many children, Santa Claus is a real,
morally concerned supernatural agent who wields the power to dispense either
gifts or coal as just desserts for good and bad behavior, respectively. As children
age, they gradually come to disbelieve in Santa Claus, even though Santa’s cogni-
tive content remains the same. Context changes, however, and as children age, they
stop witnessing credibility-enhancing displays of others’ faith in Santa. As a result,
Santa Claus is a god to children, but an entertaining folktale (and useful tool) for
many adults. (See Gervais and Henrich [2010] for further discussion of these
related points about Zeus and Santa).
Moving forward
The cognitive science of religion has anchored the study of religion in up-to-date
scientific explanations of human cognitive architecture (Boyer 2003). This perspec-
tive also has effectively fulfilled the promise of ‘naturalizing religion,’ that is,
offering a viable program of research that can demonstrate, step by step, how
well-understood natural cognitive predispositions statistically shape and constrain
the mental representation and cultural distribution of religious beliefs and beha-
viors in populations of minds. We propose that the content biases that have been
the foci of this approach, such as the mnemonic advantage enjoyed by minimally
counterintuitive concepts, are necessary but insufficient to explain religious
beliefs and commitments. These content biases render some concepts successful
because they are inherently attention-grabbing and memorable. However, we
suspect that children and adults, who are equipped with cognitive abilities for epis-
temic vigilance and skepticism, are less likely to actually believe in counterintuitive
concepts. This presents a dilemma for the current cognitive approaches to religion
that focus solely on content biases. To gain a more complete understanding of the
predictable recurrence – and occasional absence – of religious faith throughout
history and across cultures, researchers must incorporate both content and
context biases in cultural learning into the cognitive science of religion. In this
view, people may find a minimally counterintuitive concept memorable (such as
in fairytales), but they only come to believe in – and commit to – the counterintui-
tive concepts supported by context biases. (See also Bergstrom et al. [2006]; Harris
and Koenig [2006]). In particular, people should come to believe in counterintuitive
concepts that most other people believe in (e.g., Henrich and Boyd [1998]), those
that successful, prestigious individuals believe in (e.g., Henrich and Gil-White
[2001]), or those to which people make credibility-enhancing displays of their
own commitment (Henrich 2009). Among other things, religion is a suite of socially
acquired beliefs. (See also Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle [1997]). In the present paper,
we proposed a theoretical framework that also anchors the cognitive science of reli-
gion in up-to-date scientific explanations of cultural transmission and evolution,
with the goal of further advancing the evolutionary study of religion.
A cultural-learning approach illuminates a number of phenomena, including the
development of children’s beliefs about both the origins of animals and the afterlife,









































processes underlying atheism. That said, there is remarkably little experimental
evidence focused on the causes and consequences of religious belief and disbelief,
meaning that the state of the field precludes, for now, the drawing of strong con-
clusions regarding a wide range of important questions. Nonetheless, an integrated
framework devoted to understanding both the cognitive biases that shape the
content of religious beliefs, and also the cultural learning biases that influence
the degree of commitment to particular religious beliefs or lack thereof, promises,
if nothing else, to clarify theory regarding the role of cultural learning in religious
belief, highlight a number of as-yet-untested hypotheses, and present a fruitful
program for future research.
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